ANALYSING THE NATURE and effects of labour's relationship to the welfare state has been a vexed enterprise. On the one hand, labour has long been suspicious of the welfare state as a weapon to undermine working-class radicalism. On the other hand, labour has sought to support the welfare state as a means of easing the worst excesses of capitalist exploitation. This ambivalence, in part, reflects conflicting labour traditions -one committed to the overthrow of capitalism and the other to die "civilising" of capital. And it is these diverse traditions that have allowed labour to play an active role in both contesting and shaping important features of the modern welfare state. In recent years, however, labour's relationship to the welfare state has become more problematic; indeed, its status as a progressive and radical critical voice has been questioned by the emergence of alternative political movements such as feminism, gay rights and queer politics, movements of indigenous peoples, ethnic communities, environmentalism, and disability groups in both Australia and Canada. And while sections of the labour movement have sought to find common cause with these movements, these alliances have sometimes disturbed, even alienated, labour's traditional constituency. Moreover, these different politics have challenged many aspects of labour's compact with the welfare state. 
Is it useful then to talk of the welfare state? As an abstraction, can we analyze its distinctive practices in any meaningful way? Our answer is a qualified yes. While the welfare state is imbricated in a wider network of institutions, policies, and forces, there is utility, most notably in the political currency of the term and its resonance in contemporary political cultures, for seeing the welfare state as having particular characteristics and forms of measurement -no matter how blurred its nrhcrc is an enormous literature on the welfare state, much more than can be cited here. edges may be. Although state provision for some social welfare is one of the defining characteristics of the modern state, not all modern polities have adopted the same social welfare regime. Generally in the western world, the state provides more welfare measures in Europe than in the us, Australia, or Canada. Additionally there are significant differences in the means of welfare provision. While most Western states have relied on insurance systems for die funding of benefits, Australia has funded most from consolidated revenue. There are also differences in die eligibility for, and delivery of, benefits. Canada in the 1970s and 1980s, for example, spent proportionately more on unemployment benefits and less on provision for the elderly than most odier capitalist democracies. In all of die capitalist democracies, old age pension programmes are the single largest social welfare expenditure, yet there is considerable variation in the composition, value, and structure of the available benefits. These differences cannot be explained solely as policy choices reflecting national differences in the preferences of the electorate, since popular demand for generous state pensions for the elderly is uniformly high. For old-age pensions as for other social welfare benefits, die timing, nature, and extent of social welfare provision is determined by die relative power of those who want die benefit and those who oppose it 3 In this paper we are limiting our focus to die formation of die welfare state in Australia and Canada, ever mindful of these broader issues and problems. Our concern is die nature of die historical relationship between organized labourdefined as trade unions, specific political parties, and social democratic ideasand die welfare state-a set of practices and institutions seeking to promote public welfare and social justice. Our concern is how organized labour has been able to influence die development of die welfare state and die ways in which the welfare state has served die interests of labour and social justice during die first half of die 20di century. One way of exploring dus problem draws on die important work by Frank Castles on comparative welfare history. 6 Castles posed die question of whether party politics or class politics was die key factor in explaining changing welfare state policies and practices. In other words, have die significant changes in die welfare state been a consequence of labour capturing control of die state through parliamentary processes or have die greatest advances been at times of strong labour mobilization, thus ensuring concessions from die state whether controlled by labour, liberal, or conservative forces? Much of Castles' book ruptures this easy dichotomy, but his argument points to class politics as die most important factor. It is the strength of mobilization, and as Castles makes abundantly clear, the forms in which this mobilization takes place, the strategies labour pursues, the policy outcomes it seeks to achieve, and, underpinning all this, the broader cultural frameworks and languages that shape struggle, strategy, and policy, that are vital to understanding the relations between state and labour.
Since Castles' formulation of the problem, other studies have pointed to the limitations of seeing labour and state only in terms of class or party politics. Labour's perception of the problem of the welfare state and participation within it was oftentimes shaped and circumscribed by liberal discourses of citizenship, participatory democracy, and social justice. This is not a matter of false consciousness, as an older tradition tried to argue, for, as recent work has suggested, labour was able to use claims of citizenship and social justice to the benefit of its own constituency and to the detriment of other disadvantaged groups. 7 Of course underpinning these problems is the question of whether the state should maintain the individual or the family as the basic social unit. Castles' formulation is primarily concerned with explaining the evolution of benefits for the individual worker. But family policy has been of equal importance and the class/party politics model is of limited benefit in explaining its development. Interest in family policy, and more specifically, in the connection between paid labour force participation and welfare provision for women and children, has lead to the recent proliferation of adjectival modifications for the welfare state. Work on maternalist, chivalrous, paternalist, patriarchal, or two-channel welfare states, from, among others, Jill Roe in Australia and Theda Skocpol in the United States, point to the state as the locus of gender as much as class politics.
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Recent attention to ethnicity and disability also stands to complicate our understanding of the operation of welfare states. Even more importantly, Canada and Australia raise, in pointed fashion, the need to analyze the function of the welfare state in the dispossession of indigenous populations. In all of these political contexts -race, gender, ethnicity, and disability -organized labour is just one force, supporting particular welfare state compacts and opposing others. Here it is possible to question Hancock's famous definition of labour parties as parties of initiative. In these wider political contexts they might equally be seen as parties of resistance. Our task then is to move beyond the confines of class and party politics to see labour in a broader political constellation.
These are problems that require historical address. They are in many respects specific and contingent, and die point of continued struggle and contest Here die comparative method is of considerable importance in pinpointing the particular trajectories of labour's negotiations with the welfare state -not just in terms of the class/party politics argument but also in a broader assessment of the effects of labour's actions on other social groups. This will be the central focus of our discussion and we attempt some tentative arguments on the basis of a comparison between Australia and Canada. The utility of this specific comparison requires some preliminary discussion.
Comparative Perspectives
When analyzing die history of die welfare state in die 20th century in a comparative context we are obviously drawn in two directions -that which is common across a specific set of comparisons and that which is unique to a specific social formation. Both offer insights. In terms of die welfare state, are Australia and Canada more similar to each other man a comparison with, say, Britain or die us? Can we talk fruitfully about invader/colonizing welfare states or is our comparison going to suggest that such a category is meaningless?
At first glance dûs type of specific comparison is tenuous. What constitutes a welfare state is well-known and obvious -state-run health, housing, child welfare, and education schemes, a wage regulation system which serves as a safety-net for the least powerful workers, workers' compensation schemes to safeguard against die consequences of employment-related illness and injury, and a large social security system to provide benefits for die aged, unemployed, ill and injured, for single parents, and for die victims of war. Now, with obvious differences in die timing of their introduction, funding mechanisms, and die modes of delivery, this catalogue of services and benefits is provided in most western nations.
The marked similarity in state welfare services and benefits is paralleled in die historical scholarship concerning these developments. In most western nations there is a body of "progressive'' or "whig" historical literature which has charted die decline of selective charity and die rise of "universalist" welfare. This literature flourished in die 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, at a time when significant advances had been made in die diversity and extent of welfare services throughout die west Critical scholarship has likewise flourished in the 1970s and 1980s at a time of crisis in the welfare state, marked by a reduction of welfare benefits and the more precise targeting of recipients in many countries. The last two decades have been marked by what observers have called "the fiscal crisis,*' "the legitimation crisis," and finally "the retreat from the welfare state," and this retreat is again apparent in most western nations regardless of political culture, economic fortune, welfare state tradition, or the party in power. ' ' In fact if one wished to work within the parameters of the "progressive" tradition it might be possible to present a Gibbonesque narrative of the rise of the welfare state, reaching its apotheosis in the early 1970s, followed by a rapid decline, with the onset of global stagflation, the collapse of the Keynesian foundations of economic theory and policy, and the rise of monetarist and new right discourses of the minimal state and the virtues of self-help.
Of course most of us would not be content with such a narrative. Recent investigations of the welfare state have done much to problematize this historiography. Some have argued that the so-called "retreat" is not so much a regression as a resurgence of the powerful discourses of individual self-help and the work ethic that helped constitute 20th-century welfare. From this perspective there are significant continuities between Victorian charity and modern welfare states. But regardless of the specific character of welfare or the nature of its historical evolution it seems evident that there are some remarkable similarities in the general shape and development of welfare states in the west over the last 100 years.
This powerful commonality in the development of welfare in the west -in the types of programs embraced and the groups most likely to be assistedsuggests that along with processes for the globalization of capital there is a cultural globalization, a shared political culture and discursive framework that shaped how the social problems concomitant with capitalism were perceived, and that in turn restricted the responses to a rather narrow set of policy solutions. Urbanization, the breakdown of local communities, and the paternal relations which sustained them, and extensive movements of people and capital, to name but a few global developments, rendered charity an inadequate response to the problem of people unable to sustain themselves in the labour market and displaced from old and new networks of support. The manufacture of poverty has been enormous and the need to 
Class and Party
Perhaps die most familiar motif of welfare state history in Australia is, using Jill Roe's pithy phrasing -"leading the world" and "left behind." Almost every study of Australian welfare has subscribed to mis in some form or other. In summary, in die late 19th and early 20th centuries a flurry of reform activity in Australia included factory and shop legislation; old age and invalid pensions; workers' compensation; conciliation and arbitration (which instituted a living wage principle); a maternity allowance; votes for women; immigration restriction; compulsory education; and child welfare allowances for foster parents. These were all in place by 1912, although mere were differences between die various Australian states in die timing, extent and character of some of these reforms. In important areas, such as immigration, female suffrage, pensions, and conciliation and arbitration, the new federal government assumed sole, or in some instances substantial, control and acted ahead of other countries, making Australia an object of particular interest for European, British, and American liberals and social democrats.
Australian reforms were not isolated and piecemeal, aimed at the most obvious social problems confronting the new federation. Immigration restriction, conciliation and arbitration and, to a lesser extent, pensions, were part of a broader reform package known as "new protection." Australian liberal governments maintained high tariff barriers to protect business from foreign competition and immigration restriction to prevent workers' wages from being undercut by cheap foreign labour; in return both capital and labour submitted to government industrial regulation (conciliation and arbitration) which sought to guarantee fair but not excessive wages for workers. Women would be encouraged to produce children through the maternity allowances (a universal one-time payment on the birth of a child), and older workers would be compensated with pensions for a lifetime of working for the national interest. Here was a compact between capital and labour brokered by powerful liberal political interests that aimed to ensure reasonable benefits for both parties.
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After 1912, the picture is substantially different. In the following decades there were very few new social security measures, particularly at the federal level, and there was sustained pressure on the arbitration system to keep wages down. Australia's subsequent failure to implement unemployment, health and medical schemes, or child and motherhood allowances meant that social security development lagged well behind the rest of the western world with, the exception of the US. This lack was partly redressed during the 1940s when the Curtin and Chifley governments introduced unemployment benefits, child endowment (family allowances), widows' pensions, and some limited hospital and pharmaceutical benefits. 16 But it failed in its efforts to introduce a health benefits scheme, and the policies it did introduce were limited in scope. In the 1950s Australia had one of the lowest expenditures on social security as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product in OECD countries. Australia continued to lag behind the rest of the world until the Whitlam Labor government in the early 1970s sought, with some success, particularly in the health field, to redress this neglect through the introduction of universalist welfare schemes. From being a welfare innovator at the turn of the century, Australia, until recent years, has struggled to introduce benefits for its citizens comparable with those available in many western nations. It was not just the timing and extent (and later lack of extension), which characterized the emergence of the Australian welfare state. There were particular characteristics that differentiated Australian welfare from that in other comparable countries-most notably the centrality of a government regulated conciliation and arbitration system and the funding of many social security benefits from consolidated revenue rather than insurance. It seems apparent that die trajectory of the Australian story is shaped by the peculiarity of its beginnings. In stepping out ahead of most other nations, Australian reformers experimented and sought to create policies that were appropriate to Australian conditions. Many other countries later opted for alternative welfare systems. This does not mean that Australian governments invented from nothing. The idea of state social initiative was commonplace by the end of the 19th century. Factory and shop legislation was well established in Britain by the 1880s, new liberal ideas of social intervention and market regulation for the uplift of workers were prevalent from the 1870s, conciliation and arbitration mechanisms were die object of lively discussion in British, North American, and Australian political economy circles in die 1880s and policies for die support of the aged were already in place in Germany. Australian reformers drew from this stock of ideas and forged an interesting policy mix. The result, as many have noted, was a wage regulation system designed to guarantee die welfare of the working man and his dependents. For those outside the labour market, primarily die aged, and later widows and deserted mothers, means and income tested pensions were the preferred remedy.
These policies, however, were advanced by an argument about the peculiarity of Australian labour conditions. The staples base of major sectors of the economy meant a considerable amount of casual and seasonal labour in turn of die century Australia, which in turn made it very difficult for many working men or women to sustain weekly insurance payments. Labour saw provision from consolidated revenue as a more equitable way to provide for those least able to provide for themselves, while business and business-oriented politicians saw contributory social insurance as the means to reconcile welfare needs to market imperatives. 8 Moreover, in a culture of high home ownership where so much individual income was devoted to home loan repayments mere was a general reluctance to accept an expanded income tax burden. Means and income tests were one method of providing for die most needy from consolidated revenue without undermining the legitimacy of the tax system. Colonial liberals had to shape their reforms to the perceived realities of Australian class relations, if the delicate compact between capital and labour was to survive. 19 What is remarkable is the longevity of this particular structure. Despite repeated efforts to introduce insurance schemes, the Trnna, "Social Origins of Social Policy,** 178, referring specifically to the debate on the maternity allowance. original system of residual welfare funded from consolidated revenue continues (with the exception of the health and new superannuation schemes) to be the basis of social security in Australia.
The Canadian state, both at the provincial and federal level, was later than the Australian state in accepting responsibility for social welfare provision. As in Australia, the Canadian federal state promoted domestic manufacturing with high protective tariffs, but labour was not granted equivalent protection through immigration restrictions. Under the division of powers negotiated at Confederation, responsibility for wage regulation and social welfare provision was given to the provinces. Until World War n, most welfare initiatives were limited to provincial programmes for workers' compensation, mothers' allowances paid to women who through no fault of their own were left to raise children without the support of a male breadwinner, factory and shop legislation, and minimum wages for women. Coverage and benefits varied from province to province, and not all provinces adopted all programmes. In 1927, the federal government moved into social welfare provision with an offer to pay half (and then three-quarters in 1931) the costs of a means-tested old age pension, with the provinces to determine benefit rates and pay the balance. Apart from the adoption of the old-age pension programme in all of the provinces by 1936, in Canada as in Australia the Depression generally was a time of resisting new responsibilities and even resiling from existing social welfare commitments. The renewed war-time prosperity, however, prompted the federal government to introduce two major programmes, unemployment insurance and a family allowance payment (child endowment) for each child.
In Canada, governments resisted labour's efforts to obtain state support for the principle of a living wage, regardless whether it was defined as an individual or a family wage. Social welfare benefits were provided for deserving individuals who were unable to participate in the labour market, or, in limited circumstances, when their market participation was inadequate for the support of family members. With the determination of wage rates left to the market, where individuals bargained as individuals rather than as heads of families, social welfare programmes provided benefits that would fill the gap between the wages the individual male breadwinner could secure in the market, and the cost of supporting dependents. 21 Moreover, some important social welfare programmes, notably for injured workers and the unemployed, were established on the insurance principle, to be self-funded by contributions from employers and employees, rather than being financed from consolidated revenue. Although, as in Australia, the staples base of the Canadian economy fostered casual and seasonal labour, the argument that insurance pro- grammes were therefore inappropriate received scant support Indeed, the insurance programmes that were implemented denied coverage to the most needy, because to include them would render the programmes actuarially unsound. Seasonal workers, and those who worked in agriculture or domestic service were excluded from unemployment insurance when it was introduced in 1941. In the absence of a living wage and the greater reliance on insurance, Canadian labour can be said to have had less success than its Australian counterpart in influencing the character of the welfare state.
What accounts for this relative difference in the role of labour in welfare state development? One factor is that organized labour in Australia was more effective than labour in Canada both in party politics (capturing control of the state through parliamentary processes), and in class politics (mobilizing to ensure concessions from the state whether controlled by labour, liberal, or conservative governments). Measured both by degree of unionization and electoral strength of left-wing and labour parties, working-class power was greater in Australia than in Canada. With its greater power, the Australian working class was able to secure greater state commitment to the ideal of the living wage. This reflected the emphasis of both liberals and labour in Australia on the ideal of the male "breadwinner," able to support a family in "frugal comfort." What was required for a living wage, however, remained subject to downward pressure. Initially a wage to support a man and his dependents, in New South Wales the Basic Wage was redefined in 1927 as a wage sufficient to support a man and his wife, without children, during the debate over introduction of that state's child endowment 23 In Canada, policy-makers rejected the idea of state support for a living wage, leaving the market to allocate compensation for labour. For example, attempts by labour to argue for a minimum payment in workers' compensation cases, sufficient to prevent the recipient from becoming the object of charity, were rejected. William R. Meredith, head of an Ontario Royal Commission set up in 1912 to recommend workers' compensation legislation, dismissed the idea of a minimum benefit: That would be most unjust.... It is just an amplification of the idea that every man, good or bad, should get the same wage, that there should be a minimum wage for a man whether he is worth it or not." Clearly, if workers wanted a decent living, they had to look to the market, not the state. of considerable working-class mobilization, class conflict, and significant political success for labour. This was a context that fostered liberal programs to use the state to defuse the conflict between capital and labour and part of this process involved constraints on capital and concessions to labour. But again, closer scrutiny threatens these easy equations. Although welfare historians, notably Dickey, have seen the wrenching battle between capital and labour during the 1890s as the foundation for Australia's welfare initiatives, in fact many of the proposed reforms of the period had been considered for some time before this. Of course, class conflict preceded the 1890s, and the new liberalism was a response to a much longer history of social unrest. Although this rejoinder holds true for arbitration and the living wage, for old age pensions the correlation is less clear. More than a response to overt class conflict or economic depression, pensions were necessitated by the rising number of dependent aged, the failure of charities to cope with this rise (already evident in the 1880s), and the inadequacies of the longstanding institutional approach to charitable and government aged care. The fiscal crisis of the colonial state in the 1870s and 1880s provided the impetus to abandon institutionalization for the treatment of the aged, invalid and infirm, as well as children, criminals, and the insane. It was cheaper and more effective to maintain such groups with government subsidies and pensions. Significantly, the non-institutional approach facilitated an expansion in new forms of social surveillance, while the benefits provided were those least likely to impact on the labour market, in that able-bodied workers were excluded from coverage. The contrast between arbitration, which seems to have arisen in direct response to class conflict, and old age pensions, which did not, points to the difficulties of trying to develop general theories about the welfare state.
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Most social welfare initiatives in Canada cannot be linked directly to labour parties, nor is class politics a fully adequate explanation of progressive welfare legislation. Indeed, in the Depression, governments which were conservative in name showed more willingness to respond to the crisis of unemployment than did their liberal counterparts. Conservative Prime Minister R.B. Bennett, in a pre-election frenzy, passed legislation providing for unemployment insurance, minimum wages, and a 48-hour work week. The threat from the left was a major impetus for Bennett's "New Deal" promises, which he hoped would undercut support from small business for a new party led by a defector from the Conservative caucus, and support from the left for the farmer/labour alliance of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF). The new legislation, however, was not enough to save Bennett's government from defeat, and was subsequently ruled unconstitutional. borne by all taxpayers, not just employers. The country could afford it -Canada was spending an equivalent amount on the war effort every two weeks.
Despite the difficulties in attributing social welfare initiatives to any single group, force or political context, both die Canadian and the Australian cases, as Fenna concludes, seem to confinn Castles' view that class politics (levels of mobilization) are crucial to welfare reform. Nonetheless, the history of these two countries also points to the political, constitutional, administrative, and ideological obstacles to reform. 33 In both cases it took the unusual crisis of war to provide the conditions for a greatly expanded welfare state. Although labour was comparatively strong during both world wars (bolstered by high employment, and in Australia, actually governing), it is doubtful that significant advances would have been made without the war context to fuel the popularity of a "new order," and to force governments to generate the bureaucratic expertise to implement it.
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War, Citizenship, and Welfare World War I facilitated important social welfare developments in both Canada and Australia. The significant loss of life demanded some form of compensation for self-sacrifice in the national interest. Here the criteria for eligibility were related to losses arising out of war-death, disability, widowhood, reduced earning capacity, illness, and later unemployment. And the schemes to alleviate these problemspensions, employment preference, training, access to land, education, hospital and medical benefits -while still emphasizing the virtues of independence and self-help, were sharply delineated from civilian welfare systems by the assertion that these were rights earned as a consequence of fulfilling one's responsibilities as a citizen, rather than gifts based on failure to provide for oneself. In providing allowances to the dependents of soldiers and pensions to injured veterans and the dependents of men killed overseas, leaders of charitable organizations, politicians, and even bureaucrats spoke of paying a debt owed to those who had made sacrifices for their country. The recipients were not receiving charity, but a payment to which they were entitled by their sacrifice. The financial commitments to war compensation were enormous. By the 1930s, 230,000 Canadians and 270,000 Australians were supported by war pensions. This amounted to a second welfare state, running parallel to that of the ordinary welfare state, but supporting citizens more generously and with fewer restrictions.
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The rhetoric of the war years and the practical consequences of substantial government expenditures on social welfare programmes for war veterans and their dependents functioned in contradictory ways. These massive welfare payments took funds that might otherwise have been spent on alleviating the effects of widespread unemployment or extending welfare benefits to other citizens. In a direct way, war benefits retarded the provision of welfare to other citizens. 38 Yet the justification for these expenditures provided an alternative discourse to the diatribes about the dangers of pauperization that remained popular with many politicians and business leaders. Once the idea of welfare payments as a right became accepted for one group, it could be transferred to others. Thus, advocates of mothers' allowances argued that these payments were not charity, but salaries to mothers who, left without a male breadwinner, would otherwise be forced into waged work. These reformers also argued that juvenile delinquency would surely follow if mothers were unable to fulfil their highest responsibility as citizens and maintain a home for their children.
In Australia, war-time rhetoric of citizenship and sacrifice undercut rather than reinforced the extension of social welfare benefits to other citizens, particularly women. Australia granted women's suffrage in 1902, well before Britain, Europe, the US, or Canada. Campaigners for women's political citizenship demanded social citizenship as well, pursuing an extensive programme of protective legislation in the workplace, measures to safeguard women from sexual exploitation, allowances 37 and greater legal rights for mothers, health reform, and improved wages and working conditions for female workers. But as Jill Roe has argued, the war stymied the women's campaign by effectively redefining citizenship in terms of "blood sacrifice" and masculine nation-building endeavour. The large investment in war pensions prevented any expansion of the welfare state to ordinary citizens. This drove conservative governments to explore insurance as an alternative means of increasing benefits. But the opposition of labour to insurance, and their insistence that reforms such as child endowment not undermine the commitment to the family wage cemented clear divisions within the welfare system. War pensioners were the most privileged welfare recipients, receiving their benefits as entitlements. Male wage earners and their dependents were supported by the wage system, and the aged, the permanently incapacitated, widows, deserted wives, single mothers, and their children received meagre welfare services and more often private charity.
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Some of these divisions were not overcome until World War n. In both Canada and Australia war mobilization affected all citizens. Total war demanded sacrifices from all, not just front-line soldiers. And in Canada in particular, memories of post-1918 labour militancy and political victories by left-wing and populist protest parties impelled the parties in power to include labour in their post-war planning, and to adopt some Keynesian economic techniques for avoiding a post-war recession. In this context, the state promised more extensive welfare services to all citizens to maintain national support for the war effort and to ensure continued economic growth after the war. Planners began to discuss the need for post-war reconstruction and a "new order"; central to these ideals were commitments to full employment, national prosperity and an adequate social security safety-net for all citizens, not just those who fought. The war not only provided the context for greater federal involvement in welfare in Canada and Australia, and a realignment of financial relations to the benefit of central government, but also provided a rationale for universal welfare services. Labour may have articulated this forcefully in Australia, but in Canada liberals performed the same function, and the consequences were similar -a considerably increased federal system of welfare benefits. 
Women and the Welfare State
Women and children are die majority of those living in poverty and their poverty persists, despite the introduction of social security and welfare systems. Neither markets nor the state compensate women for die work of child-rearing and household maintenance, and even in die workplace, sex segmented labour markets and pervasive traditions of lower wages for women ensure diat women have fewer opportunities to escape from poverty. But should welfare payments mirror die market or correct it? Historically, welfare systems have operated to create and enforce social norms. In deciding whether to allow for die support of dependents in setting benefit rates in social welfare programmes, policy makers were grappling with a fundamental issue in liberal-capitalist states: bow to resolve die disjunctures in resource allocation that follow from regarding die individual as die basic unit of society when workers are negotiating dieir wage contracts, while requiring male workers to finance die cost of reproducing die labour force duough assigning to diem die primary responsibility for die welfare of modiers and children. In Canada, employers insisted diat wage rates for male workers be set according to die work done, not die needs, personal responsibilities, or otiier attributes of die individual. Australia, by contrast, implemented a living wage principle diat recognized and allowed for men's responsibility to support women and children. But in both systems, die wage for women's work outside die home was linked to their gender, not their effort or job performance; women were paid less because tiiey were women, not because of their capacity or die nature of dieir work. And it was this practice which undermined die capacity of women to live independently of men.
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Attempts to guarantee women a measure of welfare security dirough wage regulation perpetuated these biases. Invariably, women's minimum wage regulations in Canada and Australia based dieir estimate of a living wage on die needs of a woman without dependents. Indeed, women's minimum wage rates ensured diat most wage-earning women faced die prospect of poorly-paid employment until diey escaped into marriage to a man, whom diey hoped would treat diem decently and earn enough for dieir support. If, duough no fault of her own, a woman was left with dependent children and no male breadwinner, she could look initially for support to private charity. In Canada, beginning in World War I, "deserving" mothers could also apply to some provincial governments for support. By 1920, Ontario and the four western provinces provided mothers' allowances for narrowly defined categories of women with dependent children -primarily widows and wives of men confined to mental hospitals, tuberculosis sanatoriums, or prisons, sometimes deserted wives, but never mothers of illegitmate children. Although recipients were vulnerable to having their allowance cut off if they were suspected of having an intimate relationship with a man, or proved themselves in other ways to be unfit mothers, the rhetoric surrounding the programme emphasized that women without a male breadwinner were state employees, paid to act as guardians of their own children.
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In Australia, women were forced to rely on a range of inadequate child welfare payments from state governments. Attempts to shift the balance of welfare provision towards assistance for dependent mothers through child endowment met with firm resistance from the trade union movement. Women in the labour movement incurred the wrath of their male colleagues when they pushed for motherhood allowances to recognize the claims of mothers to a welfare right. Men in the union movement maintained their commitment to the breadwinner principle. They acted to defend this principle against liberal reformers who sought to tie child endowments to the living wage. These reformers argued that some men were being paid for children they did not have while others were not being paid enough for the children they did support. Families would be paid an endowment for the precise number of children they had, but to compensate, reformers demanded that the living wage be reduced. Trade unions in Australia opposed this measure and as a consequence women with dependent children were denied social security payments until the 1940s. were successful in resisting a family wage rate. Family allowances and other welfare benefits were one response to concerns about the gap between a man's earnings and the needs of his dependents. By providing for a payment to the parents for each child in the family, the state assisted the male breadwinner to provide for children within the nuclear family, without forcing employers to pay a family wage. The state, by assuming some responsibility for the welfare of all families, not just those which had traditionally been the objects of charity, could ensure that workers received a living wage while leaving capital free to pay wages that were insufficient to cover the real costs of labour power, that is, the cost of maintaining the individual worker in the short-term, and the costs of raising children to supply replacement workers in the long-term.
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But the Australian living wage system was not an adequate alternative for women and children. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, government inquiries revealed that the living wage fell far short of that needed to guarantee frugal comfort" for a family. And throughout the inter-war years, employers persistently argued that living wage determinations had to take account of the "capacity of industry to pay," a factor also considered by Canada's minimum wage boards in setting women's wage rates. The acceptance of this principle by arbitration tribunals further undermined the capacity of the wage system to provide for women and children. At the same time, labour fought to prevent wage rates being undercut by female competition -urging equal pay for women when they were in direct competition with men and supporting lower minimum wages for women when they were not This acted to maintain the importance of the male breadwinner family in the articulation of the wage and the welfare system. It operated against the interests of those who did not have a male breadwinner to support them.
State welfare policy thus underwrote liberal assumptions about the market economy in complex ways. In Canada minimal regulation of the employment relationship and meagre welfare benefits to some of those who were unable to provide for themselves through waged work, helped contain labour unrest and maintained the separation between production and reproduction. In Australia, state welfare policy underwrote the same liberal assumptions about the market economy and a normative family structure of male breadwinner with a dependent wife and children, but the state, through its support for the family wage, was willing to force employers to assume some of the costs of reproducing the labour force which the Canadian state transferred to the taxpayer in general. In both instances women with dependent children were the least protected by these arrangements. But with some 
Canadian provinces establishing mothers' allowances for those women and children without a male breadwinner, the weakness of Canadian labour in the wages system was partially offset by liberal, and in Skocpol's terms, matemalist, benefits. These benefits, however, reinforced female dependence by supplying state support and supervision in place of the missing breadwinner.
Indigenous Peoples and Welfare
The group most excluded from the benefits of social security are indigenous peoples -the Aborigines in Australia, and the First Nations and Métis people in Canada. In Australia at the very moment (1890s-1900s) when there was a shift away from institutionalization towards social security for many disadvantaged populations, Aborigines were placed under new forms of confinement. Through a rigorous system of reserves, missions, and protection legislation, many Aborigines were confined to specific institutions, stripped of almost all civil rights and had their children forcibly removed from their care. Here was another manifestation of state-sponsored dispossession. In the Northern Territory where there were shortages of labour, Aborigines on reserves were leased out to local employers in the pastoral and pearling industries, at exploitative rates of pay (which were not paid to the workers) and housed in often appalling conditions. Here, despite gross exploitation, many Aborigines in the workforce and on reserves and missions were able to maintain a sense of cultural identity and forge meaningful roles within these systems of regulation and confinement. In the 1950s, however,with the push towards policies of assimilation, reserves and missions were gradually dismantled. Indians and Indian lands were a federal responsibility. Arguments over constitutional responsibilities and lack of respect for aboriginal peoples and the social welfare rights contained in their treaties left aboriginal peoples, on or off the reserve, with inadequate social services, educational facilities, or even basic amenities such as adequate housing. Until 1960, status Indians were denied a basic right of liberal citizenship -the right to vote. Enfranchisement meant giving up one's status as an Indian and therefore one's right to whatever welfare services the federal government provided on the reserves. The poverty of the dispossessed indigenous peoples and the lack of understanding of family relationships within aboriginal society justified removal of aboriginal children to residential schools or to white foster homes, where the policy of assimilation could be pursued relentlessly. As in Australia, only the emergence of a strong native rights movement forced governments to recognize aboriginal rights to self-determination and to compensation for loss of their land, both pre-requisites for an autonomous social welfare system.
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The treatment of indigenous peoples attests to the inadequacy of many accounts of the welfare state. Many of these histories have argued for specific narratives of "progress," around such motifs as "charity to welfare state," or "poorhouse to pensions." But the fate of indigenous peoples, increasing rates of ill health, alcoholism, malnutrition, crime, and poverty point to the limitations of such narratives. Moreover, the trajectory of indigenous welfare, usually towards greater levels of institutionalization until the 1960s, ran counter to the development of the welfare state for other citizens. Historically, welfare systems for indigenous people have played a central part in the construction and maintenance of chronic poverty and ill health. And neither class or party politics argument can offer an explanation. Both labour and conservative governments perpetuated this oppression. Although some labour activists played an important role in criticizing these policies, the labour movement as a whole remained largely acquiescent, at least until the 1970s, and then joined in protest only after significant indigenous mobilization. There is a clear similarity in the welfare systems of invader/colonizing societies like Canada and Australia -historically they have operated to facilitate dispossession.
Labour and Welfare
The history of indigenous welfare and the obvious failure of the welfare system to deal adequately with the problems of women and children raise important questions about the nature and character of the Australian and Canadian welfare states. They attest, in a very direct way, to the pertinence of Castles' characterization of the Australian system as a workers' (and importantly non-aboriginal male) welfare system, with the market, regulated by the state, guaranteeing the material conditions of male breadwinners and their dependents, and a residual social security system assisting the most needy or those unable to participate in the labour market. In Skocpol's dichotomy of paternalist and matemalist states, the Australian case appears to be at the paternalist end of the spectrum. Canada, however, with its weaker support for the male breadwinner and greater concern with the problems of mothers, children, and more recently the unemployed, is more matemalist. But in their history of dispossession of indigenous peoples, their relative reluctance to intervene in the market, and the residual character of welfare in both Canada and Australia, these invader/colonizer welfare states fall far short of the extensive "matemalist" systems operating in social democracies in Europe.
In part this reflects the strength of capital and the pervasiveness of liberal ideologies of manly independence, respectability, and self-help in both Canada and Australia. But it also reflects some of the preferred policies of labour. In both countries labour stressed the ideals of worker's welfare, addressing the needs of the breadwinner over those of other citizens, or arguing that these needs would be best met by sustaining the breadwinner with a family wage. Here we need to return to the political culture of labour and the debate about labourism.
In both Canada and Australia, 19th-century rural populism was a significant influence on the formation of labour culture. It contributed to a virulent antagonism to the original possessors of the land and to those they feared might want to take the land from them -Asians in the case of Australia and in Canada, too, particularly in British Columbia. Of course labour was also the vehicle for collectivism socialist, and social democratic ideas, but substantial and powerful sections of the movement drew their energy and commitment from the experience of being struggling and frequently failed small farmers. Equally frontier societies like Canada and Australia were promoted as havens from industrialization, places where an honest, hardworking man might make a decent living; on the diggings for some, more generally on the land. Even the urban male worker was said to stand a good chance of becoming independent, with his own small business. What prevented their success were the rentier classes, the unproductive and parasitic landowners who monopolized land. What was needed was state intervention to break the grip of monopoly and allow access for the worker. In the 20th century this demonology was transformed into "the money power" or the "vested interests." It is a crucial rhetorical shift -the enemy was not capitalism but the monopoly of banks, financial brokers, and in Canada, the railways. The state here had to be
